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INCENTIVES TO AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
PAUL H. GmAmn*
"Should it be the carrot or the stick?" That is the metaphorical question econo-
mists often ask about pollution abatement programs. In the debate which has ensued
between economists, legislators, administrators, and businessmen, adversaries have
cloaked the substantive issues in a shroud of public rhetoric. It is the purpose of this
article to help cut away this shroud, and to lay out the basic policy alternatives avail-
able to those who would control air pollution.
I
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
There is small if any doubt that air pollution can and has caused substantial social
and economic losses. Its role is well documented in experiments, tests, and experience
gathered from major episodes. Air pollution contributes to the corrosion of metal and
stone; it discolors and makes buildings dirty outside and inside; and in general it
contributes to the blight of the neighborhood.
Air pollution also damages and destroys plant life-leading to agricultural and
aesthetic losses. It places real restrictions on the types of vegetation that may be
raised in many areas of the country. In New Jersey, for example, pollution injury
to vegetation has been observed in every county and damage has been reported to at
least thirty-six commercial crops Air pollution may also limit plant growth and
production, impair quality, and may even reduce vigor to a degree where plants are
predisposed to further losses as from biotic pathogensO
More importantly, air pollution imposes costs in terms of human health. In
testimony before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Committee
on Public Works of the United States Senate, Dr. William Stewart, Surgeon General
of the Public Health Service, unequivocally stated that air pollution is "unquestionably
a factor in the development of not one, but many, diseases affecting literally millions
of our people.' 4
The sharply rising incidence of lung cancer, emphysema, bronchitis, and asthma
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has been associated with air pollution. Epidemiological surveys reveal that death
rates from cardiorespiratory diseases in general are noticeably higher in urban than
in rural areas, and that rates increase with city size, as does air pollution.5
Dr. Dubos observes that whatever its apparent selectivity, any biologically active
substance is likely to react with more than one function. Above and beyond the direct
toxic effects that occur rapidly and which are easily detected, there are others that
develop more slowly and indirectly.6
Government cannot eliminate these economic and social costs by cleaning the
air stream as it can purify water for public use. The only practical solution is to
reduce substantially the uncontrolled disposal of pollutants to the atmosphere. Air
pollution control involves political, economic, and social considerations. The econo-
mist's contribution to the discussion of the problem is to attempt an evaluation of
some alternative ways in which society might restructure the market process to bring
about improved air quality and how these alternatives might compare with direct
regulation and enforcement approaches.
I
WHY is Am POLLUTION AN ECoNoMIC PROBLEM?
The economist sees air pollution as a classic case of an external diseconomy. Ex-
ternal diseconomies arise whenever market forces alone are insufficient to make an
individual bear the full costs including the social costs that result from his actions.
If these costs can somehow be internalized so that the economic unit generating pollu-
tion is required to pay for its elimination, then the diseconomy is removed
In a profit-motivated economy profits are maximized to the extent that the cost of
waste disposal is minimized. Profits are also maximized to the extent that waste is
turned into valuable by-products or recovered products. When the value of such
products exceeds the costs of producing them, waste reduction, like the practice of
honesty, is its own reward. When the costs of waste reduction and disposal are not
offset, the costs of disposal are borne by others than the producer of the wastes.
The costs are clean-up and disposal costs. Or they are personal, material, and esthetic
damages that are suffered in tolerating polluted air, putrid water, and a trash-littered
landscape.
The producers of pollution are generally unaware of the total effects of the pollu-
tion they produce. No one producer has an incentive to eliminate his pollution en-
tirely; his incentive, commonly, is limited only to the elimination of that part which
adversely affects his own operation. The arguments against going farther are that
it will cost too much, that prices will have to be increased, that consumers will not
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buy it, and that there is no proof that air pollution is damaging anything anyway,
so why pick on me.
It can be asserted that, for survival, producers are obligated to provide a product
of value. It can be asserted further that, for social efficiency, value includes product
safety and minimum social costs. There can be no question that pollution will be
reduced if appropriate incentives can be identified and provided which force pro-
ducers to account for product safety and social costs.
A manufacturer calculating private costs of production will include raw materials,
labor, equipment, facilities, overhead, advertising, and taxes. He will annualize costs
based on useful life of capital. He may or may not include the costs of disposing of
waste gases and dust. A large portion of these by-products of the manufacturing
process are still dispersed into the air and justified on the ground that it is an
economic function of the atmosphere to assimilate such wastes.
If there are only a few stacks, only a few automobiles, and a limited number of
heating units sending pollutants into the air over a community, and if atmospheric
conditions are such that these pollutants are soon gone with the wind, the disposal
of wastes to the atmosphere may seem efficient. But, if there are many stacks, many
automobiles, and thousands of heating units within a limited geographic area all
contributing their respective wastes to the surrounding pool of air, the resulting
pollution may not be assimilated and costs will be imposed on society.
III
PossIBLE ECONOMIC INCENTiVES
It should be obvious that internalizing costs does not necessarily mean that pro-
ducers must bear the total burden. Since the public benefits from both clean air and
a productive industrial sector, it is reasonable to expect that the public will pay some-
thing for the control of pollution. The question is how.
Examination of alternatives suggests that there are basically two types of incentives
that may be used to encourage polluters to reduce or eliminate the emission of
pollutants into the atmosphere: economic incentives and enforcement of regulations-
the carrot and the stick.
The economic incentives involve the public's sharing the costs of control in a
rather direct way. One simple form of economic incentive would take the form of
tax credits and fast write-offs for the initial purchase and installation of control
equipment. Other forms of economic incentive would include award payments,
emission charges, or combinations of payments and charges. These might be useful
in stimulating reduction of emissions over the long run. Award payments might
be geared to a percentage reduction from total potential emissions, to an absolute
reduction in terms of certain amounts of pollutants, or to the attainment of an
emission standard set by a government regulation.
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With a system of emission charges, a company might pay a low charge if the
damage caused by its emissions were low, and a high charge if the damages were
high. There would be nothing except the economic motivation provided by the
incentive scheme to force control of emissions.
In a system combining award payments and emission charges, companies exceed-
ing emission standards might receive payments to offset the cost of control and to
keep them from relaxing to the required levels. Companies emitting large amounts
of pollution might be charged as an incentive for them to approach the standards.
Charges could be geared so that it would be noticeably cheaper for polluters to meet
emission standards than to pay emission fees. Charges could conceivably be structured
to pay the costs of awards.
The principal alternative to using financial or economic incentives to change the
behavior of a polluter would be for a government to enact legislation requiring that
certain emission standards be met. Failure to comply could entail the payment of a
comparatively steep fine for each day a company is in violation of standards.
A. The Provision of Incentives Through Equipment Tax Credits
Equipment tax credits might appear to be the most attractive economic incentive
from the viewpoint of industry. This is a tentative conclusion based on the fact that
some forty-odd bills have been brought before Congress which would provide tax
credits, rapid write-offs, or both, for the purchase and installation of air pollution
control equipment.
A typical bill would offer a twenty per cent tax credit for capital investment
instead of the seven per cent credit now allowed for new facilities and equipment.
It would also offer a write-off for depreciation purposes of from one to five years
instead of the standard useful life basis, which could be twenty years or more. If
enacted, such legislation could provide a benefit to industry of roughly $300,oo0 to
$400,000 above present rates for every $i million it spends on the purchase and
installation of air pollution control equipment.
It has been estimated that, under the present seven per cent investment tax credit,
perhaps $io to $25 million of assistance is given each year to manufacturing firms in-
vesting in air and water abatement equipment combined. Air and water pollution
control equipment is also included under the accelerated depreciation allowance for
capital equipment-such as double declining balance and sum-of-the-years-digits. The
effect is roughly similar to an interest-free loan for the amounts involved. The
current annual subsidy through this provision may be $i5-3o million.8
There are a number of possible problems associated with tax credits and rapid
write-offs as an incentive to air pollution abatement. In the first place, it may be
difficult from a practical administrative standpoint to determine how much of a
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plant's investment should be charged to pollution control and how much to process
changes undertaken primarily for increased productivity that incidentally may affect
a significant reduction in the production of air pollutants. If pollution control
means buying a specific piece of equipment, such as an electric precipitator, and
installing it to trap escaping and valueless pollutants, then it is comparatively easy
to assign costs. But when pollution control is not limited to such simple, end-of-
the-line devices, the assignment of costs is considerably more complicated and would
depend heavily on engineering and economic judgments.
The problem is further complicated when air pollution control produces valuable
by-products. A producer of carbon black, for example, uses a highly sophisticated
filtration system to prevent the loss of a product worth several cents per pound.
A recent issue of Mill and Factory magazine cited other examples which illustrate
the importance, for any economic incentive scheme, of relating incentives to net
costs.
A steel company has developed a smoke-cleaning process which traps most of
the iron dust particles and, after putting them through a sintering process, recharges
them for use in its open hearths.
A chemical company has a plant with a dust collection system that accumulates
about 4000 tons of fly ash a year. This "waste" material contains about 70% carbon,
and its re-use as fuel brings the company substantial savings. Another plant of this
same company used to emit foul smelling benzothiazole. Control equipment costing
$85,ooo was installed and now the company recovers about $5oooo worth of benzo-
thiazole a year.
A chlorine user with air pollution controls is now recovering "waste" chlorine
that had formerly cost him $6o a liquid ton. The recovery costs are now down to
only $i9 a ton.9
A second difficulty involves the possibility that a policy of tax credits for capital
expenditures would encourage industry to commit resources to control hardware
approaches instead of looking for possibly lower cost approaches. If this were the
result, equipment tax credits would be an inefficient subsidy from an economic point
of view.
This bias was succinctly stated by the Working Committee on Economic Incen-
tives of the Federal Coordinating Committee on the Economic Impact of Pollution
Abatement in its recent report:'10
The subsidy is in a small part illusory because the assistance would be given for
a higher level of expenditures caused by the subsidy creating an incentive to over-
use of capital to the neglect of operating and maintenance expenditures. This
would arise because capital costs are made artificially cheaper by virtue of a tax
write-off. Tax write-offs are handicapped because they are incapable of providing
assistance to all of the costs of abatement. The capital cost accounts for roughly
one-third of the total cost for water pollution abatement and one-eighth for air
'The Case for Clean Air-A Special Report, MILL & FACroRY, April 1967, at 41, 56.10 FRDmLj COORDINATING CommrrrEE 27.
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pollution abatement. Of course, with subsidies given to capital alone, the capital
cost proportion will tend to rise and unnecessarily consume more resources. The
addition of chemicals or supervisory personnel often times is less costly than
building additional capacity in order to treat larger waste loads. Fuel substitution
alone is estimated to be the least-cost alternative in over 6o percent of the cases
involving air pollution abatement.
Fuel substitution may be a particularly practical approach to the reduction of
sulfur oxide emissions for many coal burning power plants. They may switch from
high-sulfur to low-sulfur content coal, to low-sulfur residual oil, to natural gas, to
desulfurized coal or fuel oil or to atomic energy-usually at somewhat increased costs.
The technology for desulfurization of fuel oil already exists and continuing research
and development continues to make such approaches appear increasingly economical.
A comprehensive economic incentive system would not discourage such approaches.
In addition to prejudicing polluters in favor of control equipment instead of
seeking lower cost alternatives, tax credits and fast write-offs would crer e additional
loopholes in tax laws, which, some would hold, are already riddled by , -cial excep-
tions. Every time aid takes such form, it tends to become a precedent Lir still more
such programs.
Another argument against tax credits and other financial type incentives is the
belief that the costs of pollution control will probably be low and incentives will not
really be necessary. It is currently estimated, for example, that for a number of
existing industries (including steel, utilities, foundries, petroleum refining, kraft
paper, cement, and chemicals) when capital costs are annualized on a ten-year life,
including an imputed ten per cent interest, the full additional cost of particulate
control will be roughly one-half of one per cent of value added by manufacture.
It would appear that such a relatively low cost could be successfully absorbed by
most sections of industry.
Some assistance is already available for hardship cases. The Small Business Ad-
ministration (SBA) has authority to make loans to approximately ninety-five per
cent of all non-farm industry in the United States. A small business is defined as a
company which is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its
field. Among manufacturing industries facing the greatest abatement costs-foods,
paper, chemical, petroleum refining, and primary metals-over ninety per cent are
eligible. Under the Small Business Act of 1958, SBA can make direct loans either by
itself or in participation with banks and can guarantee loans made by banks." Direct
loans may be up to $iooooo, $i5oooo for SBA participation loans, and $350,000 on
guaranteed portion of loans made by private banks. Interest is set at five and one-half
per cent on SBA funds and up to eight per cent on bank funds. The maximum term
is ten years except for that part of the loan used for facilities construction, which may
run up to fifteen years.'2
11 15 U.S.C. § 636(a) (1964).
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Economic Development Administration (EDA) assistance (financial and techni-
cal) can be offered any company, regardless of size, "if pollution abatement actions
should 'tend to limit modernization, expansion or solvency of the facility.' Usually
such a plant must be in a county which is designated as a 'depressed area.' Nearly
one-third of the land area in the United States is currently designated as depressed."'
Even in areas
outside of "depressed areas," EDA can pay all the cost of technical studies for
the purpose of identifying least-cost methods of abating pollution for plants in
towns or sections of cities threatened by reduced economic activity. The only
condition is that the pollution abatement actions against the affected plant can
potentially or actually cause an increase in unemployment. Such a broad mandate
allows adequate latitude for assisting any hardship plant which is otherwise
economically viable except for the short-term burden of pollution abatement
expenditures."4
If some kind of additional tax incentive system were to be insisted upon, a some-
what flexible scheme might be developed along the following lines. A government
might pay some share (say, fifty per cent) of the full additional costs of meeting
governmentally imposed pollution control standards. The capital cost would be
the annual amortization of required anti-pollution capital investments, plus im-
puted interest. Operating costs would include the direct additional costs of energy,
water, operating labor, and proper maintenance of the control effort. The calculated
payment could be-added to income for tax purposes.
Tax credits or cost sharing payments might be limited to the extent that annualized
pollution control costs exceed some share (say, one per cent) of value added on a
plant basis. The share of value added is used here as a proxy for burden, but it is
not identical with burden.
A guiding rule of such an incentive system would be that pollution control costs
must be defined as those incurred in meeting specific requirements imposed on the
firm pursuant to government regulations. Government revenue officers could pre-
sumably determine the full additional annualized costs of pollution control on the
basis of statements and other information provided by the affected firm.
B. Award Payments
Emission reduction payments could, theoretically, be geared to the amount of
abatement achieved (i.e., pounds of pollutants recovered), or they could be geared to
achieving and maintaining a particular standard of performance (i.e., a power plant
reaching a ninety-five per cent reduction of potential sulfur oxide emissions). Pay-
ments could be adjusted to produce various levels of performance. For example, when
weather forecasts indicate a severe temperature inversion which would trap pollution
over a metropolitan area and create an air pollution episode, performance payments
"I1d. at 32.1 4 Jd.
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could be raised to reduce emissions and the resulting concentrations of air pollutants.
Industries might respond by switching to low sulfur fuels or curtailing operations until
the episode danger had passed. Award payments would help offset both the higher
costs of fuel and the shutdown expenses.
While all of this is theoretically possible, a major problem with emission payments
at the present time is that a technology for economically and effectively measuring
emissions is not available. It is questionable, furthermore, whether engineering
estimates of emission volumes would satisfy the measurement needs of an emission
reduction payment system or of the legal requirements such a system might impose.
C. Emission Fees
With an emission fee system, a firm could choose to abate pollution to meet emis-
sion standards or pay a relatively high emission charge. An analogous system of efflu-
eat fees has been applied in the Rhine Valley for water pollution control with some
success. Emission charges for air pollution control, however, appear less well suited
to the pollution control problem.
In water pollution, it may make sense to give a large polluter like an industrial
plant a choice between treating its own effluent or paying a fee for a government
agency to do a job of stream cleaning from multiple sources. But the air cannot be
stream-cleaned by such secondary off-site treatment systems. Once pollutants leave
factory stacks or automobile exhausts they are in the air until dispersed by natural
forces. As Allen V. Kneese has observed,
... we are in somewhat the same position in regard to polluted air as the fish are
to polluted water. We live in it. Accordingly, control of air pollution is largely a
matter of preventing pollutants from escaping from their sources, eliminating the
source, or shifting location of the source or the recipient.15
In water, a polluter who decides to pay an effluent fee rather than control emissions
at the source is, in essence, making a payment for a service-which cannot be rendered
for polluters of air.
Another difficulty is that a fee system could be exceedingly difficult and costly
to administer. As mentioned above, emission measurement technology is presently in-
adequate to meet the requirement that a regulatory agency be able to determine with
some precision just how much an individual polluter is contributing to the atmo-
spheric burden. It might be equally difficult to decide how to determine what the
fee structure should be in order to attain a satisfactory level of air quality.
IV
REGULATION
The obvious alternative to purely economic incentives would be to legislate
emission standard regulations and enforce them with fines and other penalties. New
15 Kneese, supra note 7, at 33.
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Jersey is one example of a state that has recently passed air pollution legislation that
combines a system of regulations with fines for violations and rebates for compliance.
The 1967 amendment to the Air Pollution Control Act of 1954 provided that:1
Any person who violates the provisions of this act or any code, rule, regulation
or order promulgated or issued pursuant to this act shall be liable to a penalty of
not more than $2,500 to be collected in a civil action by a summary proceeding
under the penalty enforcement law (N.J.S. 2A:5 8-i et seq.) or in any case before
a court of competent jurisdiction wherein injunctive relief has been requested.
If the violation is of a continuing nature, each day during which it continues after
the date given by which the violation must be eliminated in accordance with the
order of the department, shall constitute an additional, separate and distinct offense.
The department is hereby authorized and empowered to compromise and settle
any claim for a penalty under this section in such amount in the discretion of the
department as may appear appropriate and equitable under all of the circum-
stances, including a rebate of any such penalty paid to the extent of 9o% thereof
where such person satisfies the department within i year or such other period as
the department may deem reasonable that such violation has been eliminated or
removed or that such order or injunction has been met or satisfied, as the case
may be, by the installation of air pollution control apparatus.
In such a situation a polluter will try to find the least costly method of control
(including methods that produce salable by-products). Process controls and fuel sub-
stitution will be used in many instances instead of heavy investment in control equip-
ment.
Net costs of control may be passed on to consumers, equity holders, employees, or
suppliers-a less direct but still effective sharing of costs. There may, of course, be
instances where price increases result in customers substituting other products, or
investors choosing among alternative investments if their returns are reduced by the
added costs of pollution control.
Where a system of regulation is used, there should always be adequate provision
for assisting companies particularly hard-hit by the cost of controls.
V
PRESENT TRENDs
Present trends in the United States indicate greater use of regulations than of
direct cost-sharing incentives. In its report, the Working Committee on Economic
Incentives stated:17
Across-the-board cost-sharing in the form of tax write-offs is not recommended
because it distorts the tax structure, causes the total cost of pollution abatement to
rise significantly, promotes excessive use of capital equipment and waste treatment
facilities, and discourages selectivity in environmental quality management. Across-
the-board use of grants and loans is similarly handicapped and, in addition, is sub-
ject to fluctuations in Congressional appropriations.
1C oh. IO5, 5 I, [1967] N.J. Laws (1967 N.J. SEss. LAw SERvIcE 357).
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Except for the control of automobile emissions, the establishment of regulations or
other incentives is, however, a state and local responsibility. Both the Clean Air Act
of 1963 and its subsequent amendments and the Air Quality Act of 196718 encourage
states to take this responsibility. Under the Clean Air Act, for instance, federal
grants have helped to produce a substantial expansion of state and local control
programs. Prior to passage of this act only sixteen states had air pollution control
legislation; today the number is forty-six. In addition, federal abatement actions
in a number of interstate areas have paved the way for state and local agencies to
cooperate across territorial boundaries. The Clean Air Act also helped stimulate a
much greater effort to develop new and improved control technology.
The Air Quality Act of 1967 reaffirms that state and local governments have a
primary role in protecting air quality,1" but gives the federal government increased
authority to act in emergency situations, 0 increased responsibility for reviewing and
approving state and regional control programs, 2' and finally, authority to establish
federal controls in states or regions which fail to establish needed controls.22
Since air pollution is no respecter of geographical boundaries, the Air Quality
Act is designed to deal with air pollution on a regional basis. The act requires the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to designate specific air quality
control regions.23 These regions will be designated on the basis of factors that
suggest that a group of communities should be treated as a unit for the purpose
of setting and implementing air quality standards. At the same time, the Depart-
ment is required to develop and publish air quality criteria for a pollutant or group
of pollutants,24 together with information on available control techniques applicable
to the various sources of that pollutant or group of pollutants.25 Air quality criteria
are derived from the best available scientific knowledge of the effects of air pollutants
on health and welfare. Still another requirement is that the Department publish
information on control techniques that will identify the best methods available for
reducing pollutant emissions at their various sources and the costs thereof-whether
these techniques involve the application of control equipment, changes in fuel use or
industrial processes, or any other practical approach.
As soon as a criterion and the related information on control techniques is pub-
lished for a pollutant, the act begins to have a direct effect on those states responsible
for the air quality control regions that have been designated. The act sets up a time-
table which states must follow in developing air quality standards and implementa-
tion plans for the designated regions. It is possible that the implementation plans will
1" The earlier legislation has been replaced by the Air Quality Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 485.
" See, e.g., § o2(a), 81 Stat. 485 (1967); H.R. RtP. No. 728, 9oth Cong., ist Sess. 1 (1967).
20 § xo8(k), 81 Stat. 497 (x967).
21 See, e.g., § io8(c)(i), 81 Stat. 492 (1967).§§ Io8(c)(2)-(4), 81 Stat. 492 (1967).
-§ 1o7(a)(2), 8 Stat. 490 (1967).
=' § 107(b), 81 Stat. 491 (1967).
2 § 1o7(c), 81 Stat. 491 (1967).
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offer financial incentives as well as regulations to encourage application of controls.
If the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare finds that the air quality standards
and plans for their implementation are consistent with criteria and related control
technology information, then those standards and plans will take effect.20 If a state
fails to establish standards, or if the Secretary finds that the standards are not con-
sistent with the criteria, he can initiate action to insure that appropriate standards
are set 7 States may request a public hearing on any standards developed by the
Secretary; in such cases the hearing board's decision will be binding.2 s States will
be expected to assume the primary responsibility for application of the air quality
standards. If a state's efforts prove inadequate, the Secretary is empowered to
initiate abatement action. 9
Backed by a federally-supported research and development effort enlisting the
support of industry,30 and by federal grants for state and local control programs, 8'
the national drive to control air pollution should be considerably accelerated. There
should be the concentration of interest, money, and talents that will allow us to lower
the emission of pollutants which exact such high economic and social costs today
and threaten to exact even higher costs tomorrow. While the major vehicle for this
progress may continue to be the establishment of emission regulations, it is entirely
possible that the development of improved instrumentation for measuring emissions
will make other forms of incentives attractive.
"S IO8(c)(x), 8x Stat. 492 (x967).
Si o8(c) (2), 81 Stat. 492 (x967).
28 § 1o8(c)(3), 8i Stat. 492 (1967).
"S 1o8(c)(4), 81 Stat. 493 (x9 67).
3°See 5§ 103-04, 8z Stat. 486 (1967).
" 5 io5, 8z Stat. 489 (z967).
